American intelligence analysts have been severely criticized for failing to anticipate the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks and for the ill-advised invasion of Iraq. The resulting Intelligence Community reorganization, intended to repair these presumed deficiencies, reflects a misunderstanding of what intelligence analysts can do and where responsibility for political and military decisions lie. In fact, the Intelligence Community is far more diversified in its tasks than is generally realized. Where analysis is done and for whom makes a large difference in its effectiveness. Moreover, changing technology is altering how it is done, where, and by whom. The border between what is 'strategic' or 'national' intelligence and 'tactical' intelligence is much diminished. At the same time, intelligence analysts all too often fail to incorporate the growing amounts of open source information, as well as analytic concepts and theories available from academic and scholarly literature.
responsibility of intelligence analysis, especially at the national level. And it also requires putting intelligence analysis -that is, intelligence products used by policy-makers and military commanders -in its proper context within overall intelligence operations. Finally, some eclectic observations about how to produce better intelligence analysis in support of operational decisions, recognizing what it can and cannot achieve, will also help remove the accumulating distortions.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS
To see why we have serious misunderstandings on this matter, one only needs to infer those responsibilities from the questions and assertions voiced by members of both intelligence oversight committees in the Congress during the hearings on a) the 9/11 Commission's findings, b) their joint committee findings, and c) intelligence reform that resulted in the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. They are deeply disturbing. One senator said that 'we must have intelligence that does not allow the president to make wrong decisions about going to war'. 1 A senior member of the House committee made the same point repeatedly about why intelligence reform was needed. Several other members from each committee made similar statements, and no one challenged the underlying implication: intelligence analysts have final responsibility for command decisions, not the president! 2 No less disturbing was that no one on the committees took issue with it. Nor did any major media commentator, reporter, or columnist. On the contrary, members of the committees called on the new Director in National Intelligence in the spring of 2005 to take punitive action against members of the Intelligence Community who were responsible for the intelligence that the president used to justify his invasion of Iraq. 3 Think about what this means for the assignment of political responsibility: suddenly, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and his analysts were made responsible for constraining the president with intelligence analysis that allows him only 'one choice' in making decisions on matters of war and peace, and, more specifically, 'the right choice'. This view implicitly subordinates the president and other statutory members of the National Security Council to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI -formerly the DCI), leaving them waiting breathlessly to learn from the DNI's analysts what political and military decisions they should make. As a witness testifying at these three different congressional hearings, I was astounded to hear the view asserted, not once but repeatedly.
It can be remarked, of course, that all of this was a charade, merely another round in the game of who would eventually take the blame for failing to be ready for the attack on 9/11 and for the disastrous consequences of invading Iraq. Perhaps it is true that the DCI and the CIA were being made scapegoats for the president's decisions, but that does not lessen the need to clarify the grossly wrong assumption about who commands the armed forces and who is elected to take political responsibility for the country's security.
That became poignantly clear a few years later. On 3 December 2007, the DNI released an unclassified version of a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran's nuclear weapons program, asserting that it was stopped in 2003, and it claims with 'moderate confidence' that the program had not been restarted. Moreover, it considers it 'highly unlikely that Iran could produce . . . weapons-grade uranium . . . before 2009'. With 'moderate confidence', the report put that date at 2010 and 'probably not before 2015'. 4 This flatly contradicted earlier estimates of an ongoing program capable of producing a nuclear weapon by 2010 or even earlier, intelligence used by the administration to keep up the drum beat for support to bomb or raid Iran nuclear facilities and destroy them in the near future, certainly before 2009. Because the DNI has been made implicitly responsible for whether or not the president could go to war against Iran by the congressional hearings a few years earlier, the NIE on Iran's nuclear program now encourages a wide public belief that the president could no longer attack Iran even if he wanted to do so. The Intelligence Community was praised by some pundits for standing up to the administration, especially to Vice President Cheney, who had been particularly strident about the necessity to attack Iran soon. Apparently the DNI released the NIE key judgments to the media both for fear it would leak in any case and because the Congress had earlier mandated that some NIE key judgments be published in a declassified version.
The damage here is more than just reinforcing a wholly wrong view of where command decision-making authority for military operations lies in the US Government. It helps the Iranians by letting them know what the administration's intelligence officials believed about their program. It does not prove or claim that Iran would not restart its program. Nor does it necessarily justify dropping UN-backed sanctions against Iran for refusing to comply with inspection requirements established for enforcing the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. And it places the Intelligence Community in a dangerously politicized position. Congress could use the DNI's estimates to try to tie the president's hand in deciding whether or not to conduct certain military operations, a considerable congressional encroachment on the executive branch's constitutional responsibilities.
Let us on reflect this emerging predicament for the DNI in light of some historical investigation. An enlightening study of the problem for intelligence chiefs during World War II is found in Harold Deutsch's article on 'Commanding Generals and Uses of Intelligence'. 5 Deutsch was in Europe during the war serving in the War Department's military history staff. Years later he drafted this article at the Army War College, examining several commanders, including Eisenhower, Montgomery, Bradley, Patton, Wavell, but also one German, Marshall Irwin Rommel. The most successful, in his judgment, were Patton and Rommel. Was it because their G-2s stood up to them and hemmed them into a specific course of action? On the contrary, when Patton proved more attuned to the chances of a German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December 1944, Deutsch concluded that his G-2 was 'lucky in his commander', that is, Patton wanted to hear Brigadier General Oscar Koch's skeptical views. The overpowering status and authority of the commander, Deutsch argued, inevitably causes the intelligence officer to make analytical judgments more or less in line with what the commander will accept, what he believes is reasonable and prudent.
This, Deutsch insisted, is the reality we must live with. Commanders, who were themselves keen on intelligence, open to its surprises and unpleasant judgments, tended to have the most effective G-2s. Bradley and Montgomery, in his account of the Battle of the Bulge, did not believe the Germans were capable of a counteroffensive at all, and when tidbits of evidence that they might be planning one were reported, they were not at all disposed to take them seriously. Patton was. And Rommel's obsession with intelligence was no less demanding according to Deutsch's study of his performance in North Africa.
Stalin's failure to make preparations for the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 is a far more striking illustration of this relationship. 6 He was warned repeatedly with highly reliable evidence of the coming attack by his own intelligence services as well as by Churchill who passed what he had learned from decryptions of the German Ultra cipher machine. Yet Stalin ignored all of these reports and stubbornly insisted that his military forces on the western border remain undeployed, giving the Germans no excuse for an attack. General Douglas MacArthur, in November and December of 1950, was likewise not inclined to recognize the several signs that Chinese forces would enter the war on the side of North Korea. And I doubt that any intelligence officer could have changed his mind.
It does seem, therefore, that Deutsch is right about this general pattern of commander-intelligence officer relationships. As an aside, it would be interesting if a military historian searched for a contrary example, one where the intelligence officer successfully changed his commander's mind when it was closed to intelligence analysis that contradicted his preconceptions of the enemy's intentions and/or capabilities. There may be such cases, but they do not readily spring to mind. Yet the idea that intelligence analysts can and must be entirely free of biases, and that they must exercise great autonomy vis-à-vis policy-makers, has been encouraged by senior CIA officials for a long time. While it is a worthy ideal, neither presidents nor commanders should assume that it is regularly achievable. In fact, it almost never is.
Deutsch's study reveals the absurdity of efforts to try to make the DNI and his analysts produce intelligence estimates that will compel a president to make effective decisions about going to war. As most senior army intelligence officers know, some commanders have an innate paranoia about adversaries which gives them insatiable appetites for more and credible intelligence. They give it first priority in all planning and operational decisions. Their intelligence officers are constantly on the hot seat, but they are also fortunate in that such commanders normally are ready to commit greater resources to intelligence collection. Other commanders tend to favor their operations and planning staffs, becoming upset when confronted with intelligence that interferes with their preferred plans. There is no organizational design solution to this problem. The bias is inherent in human nature and always remains a danger.
WHERE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS IS DONE AND THE IMPL ICATIONS
Where intelligence analysis is done has huge implications too often ignored or misunderstood. Analysis at the national level differs in one respect from analysis within departments and military commands. Deutsch was studying intelligence officers on military staffs. They are an organic component inside the organization that uses the analysis.
The analytic component of the CIA, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), does not belong to any intelligence user's organizational staff. It is, therefore, separated from the planning and operational processes at the White House and elsewhere in departments and agencies. This creates a serious problem for its analysts. Unless they are in daily contact with operational staffs, how are they to know, in a timely fashion, what analysis is needed or relevant? What false assumptions about adversaries underpin plans and operations? Even if they can find out in a timely fashion, how are they to make planners recognize their flawed work? If they deliver their analysis to the heads of departments, the incumbents are normally not involved in the day-to-day or hour-to-hour planning processes going on inside their organizations. If they are, and if they are persuaded by the CIA/DI's analyst, they must thrust it downward upon their own staff, something most operations and planning officers resent.
These disadvantages make most of the CIA/DI's analysis both too late and too disconnected from policy-making and operational processes to be effective most of the time. When DI analysts visit policy-making and operations staffs to ask what their needs are, these users normally have only vague ideas of what to request. Where the analysts are organic to operational staffs, they remain constantly abreast of operations and policy-making so that they are able to see what intelligence is needed. In other words, a key role for analysts is making users aware of intelligence they need but do not know it, or do not want it because it is 'bad news'.
Over the last decade, many CIA/DI analysts have been loaned to operational staffs, not just within Washington, but also to military commands at the tactical level. They are probably far more effective than most other analysts in the DI, and precisely because they have been part of the intelligence-operations team.
The CIA/DI's organizational autonomy has another effect important to notice, not least because it tends to justify the assumption that the CIA should provide intelligence that forces a president to make effective decisions. As mentioned above, this unrealistic assumption is reinforced by the CIA's ethic of wholly 'objective' and 'apolitical', or purely 'professional judgment' in analysis and intelligence production. With their organizational autonomy, they insist that they are positioned to discern and report the unvarnished truth while those working under policy-makers and commanders are subject to their superiors' political biases. Indeed they are, as Deutsch cogently demonstrates, but that raises another question: do or can intelligence analysts know the full and unbiased truth about adversaries? The answer is clearly 'no'. They can only make best guesses.
For anyone who doubts this, simply observe the academic world where social sciences and historians, presumably working with all the facts, arrive at radically different answers to the questions they address. True, a strong effort is made to maintain scholarly objectivity, and that is as it should be, but it does not remove the normative biases humans inherently bring to their research. Given that intelligence analysis shares much in common with scholarship (and more with journalism), how can the DI's analysts be expected to divine the single and only truth about an adversary? They cannot, and that is simply a fact we have to accept. Intelligence analysis, like Clausewitz's assertion about going to war, is a gamble, a throw of the dice, a matter of chance and probability. And the only test of its effectiveness, like strategic command in war, is the final outcome. At the same time, Clausewitz recognized that critical 'study' of previous and present military operations can improve the odds of luckier command decision-making. And so it is for intelligence analysis, which is a key part of gaining glimpses of 'reality' through the 'fog of war' and the fog of policy-making.
In most federal agencies that use intelligence, intelligence analysts are grouped into a single intelligence unit. Unlike the DI of CIA, they have an executive official or policy-making agency head directly above them, and they are part of the user organization. Their integration into the planning and policy-making elements of each agency, however, varies considerably. In most, it is limited. Two reasons explain this. First, it must work in a fully secure set of offices with secure communications and storage space for its files and documents. The planning and operational staffs generally do not want to operate within such facilities. Second, most of the information needed for planning and operational decisions in the civilian agencies is unclassified. The need for classified intelligence analysis is not great most of the time. Moreover, interactions with the media and with foreignersdiplomats and others -create a serious problem for securing intelligence documents. In the State Department, a large user of intelligence, where much of it is very sensitive, this is an especially difficult problem. It can also be a problem in Treasury, Energy, Transportation, Commerce, and Justice, the other departments that use intelligence more or less extensively. Homeland Security, a relatively new department, is still evolving in its use and the location of intelligence analysts, but it should have more in common with the Defense Department than any others, and therefore fewer problems of integration.
The Defense Department itself is the largest and most complex user of intelligence analysis. Unlike all other departments -excepting the FBI's role in Justice -it includes large intelligence collection agencies and activities, by far the largest in the entire Intelligence Community. For the most part, its analysts are effectively integrated into planning and operational staffs. In the three military departments and in the Joint Staff and its worldwide military commands, intelligence analysts are the most effectively integrated of all.
It was not always so. Only beginning with World War I, when the War Department finally created a G-2 on its general staff, in line with the original design devised during Secretary of War Elihu Root's reform in 1902, did this integration take a modern and formal shape. The Navy, of course, has always had its own unique intelligence requirements and techniques for integration, some of which go back quite far, but today its needs are far more complex, mainly relying on technical collection and processing that require both special technical competence and close integration with operational staffs and commanders.
The Air Force also has unique requirements, both in the kinds of intelligence analysis needed and in the organizational integration of its analysts and chief intelligence officers. Still it retains similarities to the needs of the Army's artillery and other indirect fire systems. It also, like naval intelligence, depends heavily on technical collection and processing, but it requires close integration with ground force operations where it is directly supporting land combat operations. The Navy has traditionally resisted having its air power integrated in support of Army and Air Force operations, but after its experiences in joint operations in the Persian Gulf War in 1991, it has made significant changes to become more effectively integrated.
A final point on military intelligence analysis concerns very large differences in the challenges facing ground force intelligence analysis compared with those facing the Air Force and the Navy during actual combat. The Navy's challenge is to know the precise location, capabilities, and actions of a fairly small number of potentially hostile naval forces at sea. Even in a rather large naval engagement, the number is relatively small, for example, a few dozen vessels at sea, several scores of aircraft. The Air Force's challenge shares some things with the Navy's task. The targets it must hit are not infinite in number, nor are the details about their locations and activities. When Air Force operations support ground forces, either through interdiction bombing or close air support, the target sets and what needs to be known about other enemy forces and activities become large, much larger than for purely counter-air or strategic bombing operations.
Army operational forces, even small tactical units -battalions and brigades -need to know large numbers of facts and details about fairly small enemy sectors where they directly confront enemy forces as well as those close enough to move into direct conflict with them. And they need to know about enemy air operations and capabilities. At the division and higher level commands, the number of things the chief intelligence officer needs to know about the adversary approaches infinity. Thus he can only see a small portion of the full picture and is forced to infer or guess the rest. For naval and air-toair battles, commanders have both much smaller and far more homogeneous things to know, but they too are left to fill out the missing pieces with guesses or simplifying assumptions.
Army (and Marine) intelligence has another distinction, a heavy reliance on human intelligence, and not primarily clandestine spies. In combat operations, a surprisingly large amount of ground intelligence collection must be done by direct observations by the forces in contact with enemy forces. This is accomplished to a large degree by non-intelligence personnel and units through their use of reconnaissance patrols and information gained from direct combat probing and reconnaissance engagements. Armored cavalry is often employed in reconnaissance, and occasionally infantry and tank units, to locate enemy forces by direct fire and brief engagements. At the same time, army and marine combat units are supported by a wide array of technical collection systems, often involving national level signals and imagery intelligence systems. Analysis done at the national level by Defense Intelligence Agency and Army analysis elements often provides additional tactical intelligence down to combat battalions. Most, but not all of this, however, is not 'time sensitive' support. The processes of orchestrating and disseminating such intelligence are far more complex and difficult than for most naval and air intelligence support. They are in constant flux that requires new techniques for bringing it to bear in a timely fashion and in forms that are usable by combat units in action. Not surprisingly then, ground force intelligence collection and analysis has lagged behind advances in naval and air intelligence. Actually, ground combat varies from war to war and from phase to phase in operations, and that requires 'organizational learning' in the course of a war. The changes from main force combat operations to counterinsurgency, for example, are large.
If we ask the same question about political intelligence, the numbers of things that one needs to know for effective analysis clearly approach infinity. And this is precisely the problem facing historians. Neither intelligence analysts in this situation nor historians can avoid selection that inexorably creates a biased or distorted view. It may be distorted in a special way by ideological or other preconceptions, but even the most rigorous objectivity can do no more than reduce the degree of bias. The fog of war and diplomacy never completely lifts, not even long after the events in question.
Army intelligence challenges, therefore, overlap considerably with those facing political intelligence analyses. The set of what needs to be known for a reasonably valid picture of the opponent's situation, capabilities, intentions, and so on, grows larger as the level of command and policy-making rises toward the very top. For example, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, if the Army limits its intelligence interest to contemporary Iraq and its military capabilities, which it apparently did, then it is bound to fail to anticipate the ethnic fragmentation that is virtually assured with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his Baathist Party and his army and intelligence apparatus. Since the US commanders would soon be facing the issue of political development in Iraq, they needed to know the country's political history and the rigidities of its political culture, going back even to Ottoman times, not to mention the post-World War I creation of Iraq by the British government. They also needed to know the politics of various sects within the Islamic faith. Obviously these are the same things that senior political leaders in Washington also needed to know.
The repository for much of this knowledge, of course, is not within the Intelligence Community but in universities where scholars study this country. Their findings are also available in many libraries. To some extent, the media may draw upon this kind of background information for educating the public at large. Thus intelligence analysis for these purposes must depend on sources that the Intelligence Community itself does not collect. The news media and academic institutions, therefore, must be exploited to the fullest. In fact, at the national level non-intelligence collection provides the largest source of needed information for policy and some military decision-making. The late Director of Central Intelligence, William Casey, once candidly observed that the president and other senior officials get as much as 90% of the intelligence they use from daily media reporting and analysis.
Intelligence analysts normally refer to such sources as 'collateral', not real intelligence. Using them and integrating them into their products has too often been done ineffectively, and much to the detriment of intelligence production. The Intelligence Community, especially at the national level and often at the tactical level, can learn a great deal from commercial news reporting. In fact, print news services, radio, and television organizations are remarkably similar in the techniques of collecting, analyzing, and distributing information to intelligence organizations, sometimes making better use of modern communications and computers. But even they are sometimes woefully remiss in exploiting academic and scholarly research on foreign countries and specialized fields of knowledge.
PRODUCING EFFECTIVE I NT ELLIGE NCE ANALYSIS
Clearly the techniques and methods for analysis vary widely depending on the types of collection, for whom they are done, and where they are done. As technical means for collection have bulked larger, techniques for analysis have had to change. Distribution and forms of intelligence collection have had to change in order to bring adequate reporting to analysts.
This in turn has created problems of integration, or 'fusion', to use a current neologism. Striving to do as much analysis as possible by technical means, especially with software algorithms, systems designers have too often promised more than they can deliver, especially in the integration of human intelligence and combat operational reports. More realism about what can and cannot be 'fused', combined with the greater computer literacy of younger analysts, has brought progress. Still, emphasis on 'processing' software, often meaning a considerable degree of machine-generated analysis, cannot replace a lot of brain work and labor on the part of analysts, especially in producing the final products in much ground force intelligence. At the same time, technical knowledge about software and online data bases must be mastered. It is analogous to a scholar's need to master the skills of archival research, using libraries, finding online journals and documents, and locating other available sources of information.
Analysts also must learn how to 'task' collectors. Collectors cannot perform effectively unless they know what analysts and users want to know and need to know. 'Need' and 'want' to know are not always the same. Most operations staffs, commanders, and policy-makers have little or no idea of what intelligence one or another part of the Intelligence Community can provide. Thus they do not know whom to ask for what. Intelligence analysts have a responsibility to learn those things for their commanders and policy-makers. Being actively engaged in the formation of policy and military operational planning, analysts can know what specific intelligence truly is needed as they listen to planners and commanders.
To push for intelligence collection that fully satisfies users' demands, however, is far from enough. As often as not, users are 'satisfied' when they should not be, when there is much else that they ought to know and consider. First-rate analysts can get that information and present it, whether or not it is welcomed by users. To be effective at this, however, they need to know a great deal about the policy-making process or military operations conducted by their organization. Lack of operational experience among military intelligence analysts can be disastrous, and until the Vietnam War, all G-2s and S-2s in tactical units were regular combat branch officers, not intelligence specialists. Training young military intelligence officers only in 'intelligence' matters leaves a lot to be desired in what it can teach. Moreover, G-2s and S-2s without operational experience frequently cannot win the confidence of G-3s, S-3s, and commanders. My own observations at the National Security Council level suggest that the same is true at the national policy-making level, not to mention in the State Department where experience as a diplomat can improve the competence of the department's intelligence analysts.
This brings us back to the earlier point about where analysts are located. Those who must deal daily with policy-making staffs and managers have a much better chance to gain a mature understanding of what policy-making is, how it is constrained, and what personal responsibilities rest on policymakers' shoulders that shape their judgments. This is the same gap in experience and understanding that too often characterizes the academic study of politics. Scholars who have had experience in the policy-making world clearly have an edge in asking the most meaningful questions in political science and shaping more effective linkage between theory and practice in politics. Those who have not are somewhat analogous to chemists who have never worked in a laboratory.
There are no easy solutions for alleviating these problems in the education of intelligence analysts. Some persons grow up in the purely academic world, or in the narrow intelligence world in government and the military, and are able to grasp the policy-making and operations realities without special education. Some are not.
To become more specific about how 'analysis' is done, it should be noted that there is no set of 'rules' or principles that, if followed, guarantee effective results. Even the best analysts must work within organizations locked in preconceptions and strong normative biases. Inevitably they will absorb many of those biases, just as historians inexorably interpret the past through the prisms of contemporary problems, ideologies, political and social beliefs, and personal preferences about how the world 'ought to be'. All that either the analyst or the historian can do is to strive for detachment, to criticize one's own analysis to the extent possible, to be skeptical. Yet excessive skepticism can induce indecision, and at some point that is no longer an option.
Periodically, congressional critics of the Intelligence Community's analytical products have called for 'competitive analysis'. In 1976 the socalled Team B, an outside group of analysts, and Team A, the Intelligence Community's top analysts, were supposed to implement this kind of competition to find the 'real' truth about Soviet military capabilities. As a result, some observers have proposed organizational reform inside the Intelligence Community to institutionalize 'competitive analysis'. This is a very bad idea for a number of reasons. First, the Intelligence Community has always been afflicted with an excess of such competition between CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and sometimes the Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR) at State versus them both or one side or the other. My own observations of this competition for much of the 1980s revealed that it did not produce a clearer or more accurate intelligence product. Rather it intensified the biases of each competitor. Second, anyone who has followed academic debates over differing historiographical interpretations of, say, the French Revolution, or the Russian Revolution, or the origins of World War I, or the Cold War, and many other such topics knows that this 'market place of ideas' produces 'heat' rather than 'light' much of the time. True, some scholars stand above those debates and take detached and more objective views of the competing arguments. Third, in the physical and mathematical sciences, where the standards of evidence and proof are less vulnerable to subjective judgments, something much closer to a truly objective judgment results. But in most intelligence analysis, competition has an effect more like that in the social sciences. It is true that policy staffs may gain more objective understandings by inviting analysts and scholars holding quite different judgments to debate their differences in face-to-face meetings. I say 'may' because it depends on those listening to the debates being able to retain a highly disinterested and critical view while hearing out analysis they do not find congenial.
Finally, for measuring the validity of intelligence analysis, the outcome of military operations or policy initiatives based on that analysis is the only test that counts. To institute a competitive analysis process among the Intelligence Community's analytical organizations is more likely to induce misleading biases on all sides than to provide new light.
There are, however, some concepts for shaping intelligence analysis that help analysts distinguish between high and low probabilities of predicting what an adversary will do in particular situations. Most important is appreciating that 'voluntarism', or the exercise of 'free will', in the behavior of adversaries cannot be predicted. If it could be, they would have no 'free will' by definition. It would be 'predetermined'. We know well that adversary leaders and military commanders often confound us with their actions. But we also know that when human action involves large numbers of people, like voting, for example, or willingness to surrender or some other mass action, our chances of guessing what the majority will do can be very good if we can get hold of reliable polling data about their preferences. Whether or not a leader of a country will decide to go to war, or reform its government or economy, or whether a military commander will choose one or another course of operational action -such decisions will surprise us as often as not. Yet another technique is recognizing what an adversary is organized, armed, or equipped to do. An enemy military force without tank units cannot launch tank attacks. And one with tank units but without infantry or combat engineers is unlikely to succeed at a river crossing in the face of armed opposition. This, of course, is to take account of structural constraints within which an adversary has to operate. Still, innovative enemies often find compensating means that have escaped our attention. This is often the case with insurgents.
The challenge for the analyst, then, is to reduce the frequency and degree of surprise. The only cogent way to do that is to study and understand the structural constraints within which political leaders and commanders are acting. Commanders are highly constrained by what they are organized and equipped to do. Political leaders are constrained by both their countries' formal and informal institutions. The historical record suggests that most political systems have a 'lock-in' manifest in both formal and informal institutions that greatly narrows their choices of action. The better analysts understand these constraints, the less often they will be surprised by the way events work out. 7 Some readers will find the foregoing observations only an expanded version of the long-standing principle in military intelligence that the focus should be on an adversary's capabilities, not his intentions. This is true, but my points go far beyond that truism. Both in economics and political science, useful theoretical concepts are available that can guide research of structure and path dependent 'lock-in' for both political and military organizations. 8 The American bias in political analysis is toward attributing vastly greater malleability for reforming and changing political institutions than the historical record justifies. The consequences of that bias in intelligence analysis can be costly.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are the most recent evidence of this truth. The informal institutions in Muslim societies, and especially in Arab-Muslim countries, are notoriously resistant to liberal constitutional reform. Only Turkey, of all Muslim countries, has come close to achieving a lasting constitutional breakthrough. In Iraq and Afghanistan, no previous regime, neither the Ottoman Empire nor Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime, broke down and integrated the tribal structure into a modern state system. Nor has any earlier regime achieved that in Afghanistan. Intelligence analysts at the national level can, if they will, introduce some of these implications of this kind of scholarship concerning what is and what is not likely to happen in the overall path of political and economic development in other countries.
Similar kinds of discomfiting insights about introducing democratic governments before constitutional order has been established are also worth careful attention. 9 Likewise, a review of literature on success and failure in counterinsurgency campaigns and nation-building throws serious doubt on most of the doctrinal wisdom on counterinsurgency and I have called elsewhere 'colonialism by ventriloquy'. 10 
CONCLUSION
This essay has been wide ranging and perhaps excessively eclectic, but it is intended to help both students of intelligence and practitioners appreciate how broad the subject of intelligence analysis is, how dynamic it has become with the influx of new technology, and how misleading it can be to use the term without being specific about what kind of analysis, for what use, and where it is done.
The surprise attacks on 11 September 2001, and the use of intelligence to justify the invasion of Iraq offer examples of gross misunderstandings about intelligence analysis. And the rush by the Congress to enact a deeply flawed reform law was facilitated by such misunderstandings. 11 These, however, are only recent examples. Throughout the Cold War, national level political analysis was beset by all kinds of misunderstandings, often fueling counterproductive quarrels among the major all-source analysis organizations. They concerned judgments about US adversaries in Vietnam and other conflicts elsewhere, as well as political developments such as those that led to the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran in the late 1970s.
Two of the more notorious ones about US intelligence analysis on the Soviet Union are the debates about the size of Soviet military spending and failure to predict the end of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Cold War. On military spending, the figure was irrelevant for two reasons. First, given that the Soviet Union had no market to produce 'scarcity prices', there was no way to calculate the real figure, either by the CIA or within the Soviet government. Second, what counted in the event of war was not money spent but the numbers and quality of Soviet weaponry. By these two measures, the Intelligence Community did a remarkably good job. On failing to predict the end of the Soviet Union, the absurdity of that charge is twofold. First, the end came because of the exercise of free will by a small number of Politburo members, especially Mikhail Gorbachev, Aleksandr Yakovlev, and Eduard Shevardnadze. Had they not decided to make systemic reforms, the Soviet Union could exist today. 12 The claim that vast internal weaknesses 'caused' the collapse is disproven by the continuing existence of Soviet-type regimes in North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam. Objective economic and social conditions in North Korea are much worse than they were in the Soviet Union, yet its leader has been willing to exercise the repressive measures essential to its system stability. Gorbachev was not. Dispositions and conditions are not 'causes'. Actors are. The other absurdity in the charge is the assumption that the United States 'failed' in some way in handling its own affairs in face of the Soviet Union's demise. Let us suppose that both President Reagan and President George H. Bush had been told by the DCI that the Soviet Union would be formally dissolved on 31 December 1991? What could either have done to cause the consequences to turn out better for the United States and its allies? No one, not the hardest of hardliners in the 1980s would have believed that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact could collapse, that Germany could be reunited within NATO without a major war. 13 The outcome is the real test of the effectiveness of intelligence, diplomacy, and military operations. Seldom if ever in history has such a dramatic outcome been achieved with so little cost of life and resources.
Within the military services and the joint commands, tactical intelligence analysis has varied greatly, from quite poor during the Korean War and Vietnam to exceptional in a number of recent wars, but the performance is uneven. This is not surprising because the nature of war almost always imposes an uneven performance on the intelligence competence of both the winner and the loser. Still, few US military commanders have gone to war with as large an advantage in intelligence that it maintained most of the time as did the Central Command commanders in 1991 and 2003. Even in Afghanistan, after a rocky start, tactical intelligence produced spectacular results.
Perhaps the most important point is that intelligence inexorably turns out to be far from what is desired, that it is a gamble, like war itself, and that intelligence chiefs cannot compensate for poor and unlucky command judgment or poor political judgment. NOTES the minister of defense in early November 1991 to take power and restore order. Marshal Yevgenii Shaposhnikov refuses the invitation. 13 For a good account of how skillfully the diplomacy that achieved this outcome was carried out, see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Reunified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1995). Also see Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, for the much of the Soviet side of this story, especially the roles of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. For example, many observers considered the Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting in Reykjavik a failure. According to Gorbachev, he believed he has struck a special understanding with Reagan that would allow him to proceed rapidly with disarmament and loosening up in Eastern Europe without Reagan taking advantage of him and engaging in aggressive, especially military, actions. Reagan, it seems, drew the same conclusion from the meeting while the staffs and the media on both sides generally missed it. See pp.128-35 on this point.
